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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
Case No. 
16898 
:MARK VON STETTINA, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
. 
------
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with rape, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-402 (1953), 
as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before a jury and found guilty 
on December 6, 1979, in the Third Judicial District Court, 
the Honorable Dean E. Conder, presiding. On January 9, 1980, 
the trial judge sentenced appellant to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years at the 
Utah State Prison. In addition, appellant was fined $500.00. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming 
appellant's conviction and sentence. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant and Ms. Stephenson first met on the 
evening of the 23rd of July at the Sun Tavern Bar in 
Salt Lake City (T.18). Ms. Stephenson had been in the 
bar for a few hours with some relatives and friends, when 
appellant approached her table and began talking to her 
(T.23). However, because the music was loud appellant 
suggested that they go outside to talk (T.23). Ms. 
Stephenson went outside with appellant without informing 
any of her companions where she was going (T.24). 
Once outside, appellant asked Ms. Stephenson 
if she would like to smoke some marijuana (T.25). Ms. 
Stephenson indicated that she did, and so she and appellant 
proceeded across the street to a parking lot, where appellant 
noticed an inclined grassy area where no one would be able 
to see them (T.26,27). They sat down together on the grass, 
-and appellant produced a pipe, which they filled with mari-
juana and began smoking (T.28,29). After each person had 
taken a few "tokes" of marijuana, Ms. Stephenson stood up and 
said she wanted to return to the bar (T.29). Appellant, 
however, grabbed Ms. Stephenson's arm and pulled her back 
down, telling hef to wait until he finished smoking (T.29, 
3 0) • 
-2-
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After Ms. Stephenson sat back down appellant 
put his arm around her, and when he finished smoking, 
he asked her if he could kiss her (T.30,31). Ms. 
Stephenson told him "No;·" however, appellant proceeded 
to kiss her, ignoring her refuals, and pushing her back 
onto the ground straddling her (T.31,33). While pushing 
Ms. Stephenson down, appellant placed his hand over Ms. 
Stephenson's nose and mouth so she could not breathe 
(T.-33.). When Ms. Stephenson tried to push appellant's 
hands away he said, "Shut up and put your hands down" 
(T.34). 
Frightened by appellant, Ms. Stephenson allowed 
him to unbutton her blouse and to kiss her (T.34). Ms. 
Stephenson repeatedly begged appellant to stop, but he 
did not stop until he heard a noise, which caused him to 
sit,up (T.36). As he leaned back, Ms. Stephenson was able 
to free her foot and kick him (T.37). Appellant responded 
by putting his hand over Ms. Stephenson's mouth and 
saying, "Do you want me to kill you?" (T.37). When Ms. 
Stephenson shook her head no in acquiescence, appellant 
pulled down her pants and removed her tampon (T.39). 
Then, appellant pulled down his own pants and had sexual 
intercourse with Ms. Stephenson (T.40). During this time 
-3-
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Ms. Stephenson continued to ask him to stop, and she even 
began to yell, during intercourse, that he was hurting her 
(T.39,40). 
After intercourse, Ms. Stephenson allowed 
appellant to kiss her and hold her hand because she 
feared that if she did not he might do something else 
(T.41). Ms. Stephenson and appellant returned to the bar, 
where she told appellant she would see him later that 
evening, hoping that he would leave (T.42,43). 
After appellant left, Ms. Stephenson entered 
the bar, and told her brother she had been raped (T.43). 
Her brother in turn told the doorman, who took them to the 
office and called the police (T.43). After the police 
arrived, Officer Hagelburg took Ms. Stephenson back 
across the street, where he found the discarded tampon (T.83). 
Ms. Stephenson testified that she did not remember 
seeing any people, from the time she and appellant left the 
bar until they returned (T.25,26,27,42). Also, the doorman, 
who called the police, associated the description given 
by Ms. Stephenson with appellant (T.72). The doorman, 
Officer Hagelburg and Officer Smith all testified that 
Ms. Stephenson was extremely upset after the alleged 
rape (T.69,70,81,87). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE P~ESENTED AT TRIAL WAS 
SUFFICIENT FOR REASONABLE MINDS TO 
HAVE FOUND APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND 
A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
Appellant was convicted of rape in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-402 (1953), as amended, which 
provides: 
A male person commits rape when 
he has sexual intercourse with a female, 
not his wife, without her consent. 
Appellant does not deny having sexual intercourse 
with Ms. Stephenson, nor does he claim she is his wife. 
Therefore, the only issue raised by appellant on appeal 
is that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the 
act of intercourse took place without Ms. Stephenson's 
consent. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-406 (1953), as amended, 
provides that an act of sexual intercourse takes place 
without the victim's consent in either of the following 
circumstances: 
(1) When the actor compels the victim 
to submit or participate by force that 
overcomes such earnest resistance as 
might reasonably be expected under the 
circumstances; or 
(2) The actor compels the victim to 
submit or participate by any threat that 
would prevent resistance by a person of 
ordinary resolution. . . . 
-5-
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Applying this standard in State v. Herzog, 610 P.2d 1281, 
1283 (Utah 1980), this Court stated: 
The determination of whether 
consent was present or absent in any 
given case is factual in nature, and 
is thus a matter for determination by 
the finder of fact. 
Accord: State v. Meyers, 606 P.2d 250 (Utah 1980). 
The Utah Supreme Court has on many occasions 
enunciated the standard by which it will review jury 
findings to determine whether there was sufficient evidence 
presented at trial to sustain a conviction. In State v. 
Allgood, 28 Utah 2d 119, 499 P.2d 269 (1972), the Court 
stated: 
• . . to set aside a jury verdict 
the evidence must appear so inconclusive 
or unsatisfactory that reasonable minds 
acting fairly upon it must have entertained 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime. 
See also State v. Mills, 122 Utah 306, 249 P.2d 211 (1952); 
State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d 110, 307 P. 2d 212 (1957); 
State v. Danks, 10 Utah 2d 162, 350 P.2d 146 (1960); State~ 
Mills, 530 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1975); State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 
216 (Utah 1976). 
In applying this standard this Court assumes that 
the jury believed that which supports the jury verdict. 
State v. Reddish, 550 P.2d 728 (Utah 1976). 
-6-
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Respondent submits that the evidence in the 
instant case, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
jury verdict, is not so inconclusive that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a doubt as to appellant's guilt. 
In fact, the evidence shows that appellant compelled Ms. 
Stephenson to submit to intercourse by force which 
overcame a reasonable amount of resistance on her part, 
and appellant compelled Ms. Stephenson to submit to inter-
course by threatening her. Ms. Stephenson testified that, 
from the time appellant began kissing her until he had 
intercourse with her that she repeatedly asked him to 
stop and that during intercourse she began screaming. She 
further states that many times she tried to push him away, 
and that she tried to kick him off of her. Ms. Stephenson 
testified that appellant placed his hand over her mouth and 
nose making it difficult for her to breathe. Finally, the 
evidence shows that Ms. Stephenson continued to resist 
appellant until he threatened to kill her and only then 
did she acquiesce (T.30-40). Therefore, appellant's 
conduct falls within the scope of Section 76-5-406, which 
establishes tha~ he had intercourse with Ms. Stephenson 
without her consent. 
Nevertheless, appellant argues that he had 
intercoursewithMs. Stephenson with her consent because 
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she allowed him to hold her hand and kiss her. In 
addition, appellant claims that the following factors 
indicate that the act of intercourse was consensual: 
the fact that there is no evidence of a weapon or a 
struggle; the fact that Ms. had no apparent injuries; the 
fact that she was friendly to the defendant after inter-
course; and the fact that Ms. Stephenson made no outcry 
or attempt to escape, even though there were other 
people in the area. Appellant's argument is untenable. 
First, there is evidence that Ms. Stephenson did 
struggle against the defendant. Ms. Stephenson testified 
that she. repeatedly asked appellant to stop, and that she 
did begin screaming during intercourse. However, contrary 
to appellant's assertion, Ms. Stephenson testified that she 
saw no one, from the time she left the bar until she 
returned (T.25,26,27,42). Ms. Stephenson also testified 
that she kicked appellant and tried to push him away 
(T.34,37). Therefore, there is ample evidence of a struggle. 
Appellant's argument also ignores the fact that, having 
threatened Ms. Stephenson, his conduct falls within the 
scope of Section 76-5-406. 
Consent.is not shown from the fact that Ms. 
Stephenson consented to accompany appellant or from the 
fact that she failed to resist so fervently that she 
subjected herself to great physical harm in the face of a 
-8-
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threat that appellant would kill her. In State v. Herzog, 
610 P.2d 1281 (Utah 1980), which is remarkably similar to 
the instant case, the defendant picked up the prosecutrix 
in the parking lot of a .local lounge and, at her request, 
proceeded to a store, where she purchased some beer. 
Pursuant to the defendant's suggestion to smoke a 
marijuana cigarette, they drove to the mouth of Parley's 
Canyon, where due to the lateness of night, no people 
wer€ around. Both the defendant and the prosecutrix drank 
a can of beer and mutually shared a marijuana cigarette, 
then the defendant suggested they have sex. When the 
prosecutrix refused, the defendant said, "dont make me 
violent." The prosecutrix then partially disrobed and 
submitted to intercourse with the defendant. 
The defendant in Herzog was convicted for rape and 
he appealed to this Court on the issue of consent. With 
reference to that issue this Court stated: 
The fact that the prosecutrix accepted 
a ride from defendant, accompanied him to a 
store where she bought beer for the two of 
them and even agreed to ride into the canyon 
with
1
him, is not legally determinative of the 
question of consent. One does not surrender 
the right to refuse sexual intimacy by the act 
of accE;?pting another's company, <?r even by 
encouraging and accepting romantic overtures. 
Id. at 1283. 
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This Court went on to state: 
. • . the law does not require an 
individual, in the face of an open and 
apparently genuine threat of violence, 
to engage in detached reflection 
regarding the sincerity with which it 
was made, or the likelihood that it will 
be carried out. This is so whether or 
not the defendant makes open display of 
a deadly weapon, and whether or not the 
victim makes outcry when such would be 
futile, there being no one within 
shouting distance. 
Id. at 1283, 1284. 
In conclusion, even though Ms. Stephenson did consent 
to certain contact with appellant, she did not consent to 
have intercouse with him as is evidenced by her resistance 
and the fact that she only submitted to intercourse with 
appellant after he had threatened her life. 
The final assertions made by appellant are that 
because Ms. Stephenson's testimony contains some incon-
sistencies and because it is uncorroborated it is 
inherently improbable and therefore, insufficient to support 
the verdict. However, the inconsistencies cited by appellant 
are peripheral in nature and they do not go to the issue 
of consent. In addition this Court has stated on numerous 
occasions that a conviction for rape can rest on the 
uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix. In State v. 
Studham, 572 P.2d 700 (Utah 1977), this Court stated: 
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Most crimes are committed in such 
secr~cy as can be effected; and that is 
particularly so of this type of offense. 
~herefore, the question of guilt or 
innocence often depends upon the weighing 
of the credibility of the victim against 
that ~f the accused. Accordingly, the 
:ule is tha~ if t~ere is nothing so 
inherently incredible about the victim's 
story that reasonable minds would reject it, 
a conviction may rest upon her testimony 
alone. 
Id. at 701. 
In the instant case, Ms. Stephenson's testimony 
with reference to consent is uncorroborated. Much of 
her testimony, however, is corroborated. Appellant 
testified that he went with Ms. Stephenson to smoke 
marijuana and that he had sexual intercouse with her. 
Officer Hagelburg stated that he found a tampon where 
Ms. Stephenson told hir.t the rape took place, which 
corroborates her testimony that the defendant removed her 
tampon before the intercourse occurred. From the 
description that Ms. Stephenson gave the doorman, he 
identified the appellant. Therefore, Ms. Stephenson's 
testimony is substantially corroborated. With reference 
to the issue of consent, there is nothing inherently 
improbable in her testimony that she made substantial 
efforts to resist the defendant, and that the only reason 
she submitted to intercourse was because he threatened 
to kill her. 
-11-
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CONCLUSION 
The only issue raised by appellant on appeal is 
whether as a matter of law the act of intercouse with 
the prosecutrix was consensual. The evidence viewed in 
the light most favorable to the jury's verdict establishes 
that Ms. Stephenson submitted to intercourse only after 
she made a substantial effort to resist appellant, 
and even then she did not submit until he threatened her 
life. Therefore, the issue of consent is resolved under 
Sedtion 76-5-406, which states that intercouse is without 
consent if the actor compels the victim to submit to 
intercoursebythreatening her or by overcoming a 
reasonable amount of resistance by force. 
-12-
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
CRAIG L. BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that I mailed two copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Respondent, postage prepaid, to 
Ms. G. L. Fletcher, Attorney for Appellant, Salt Lake 
Legal Defender Association, 333 South Secpnd East, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111, this ~~ay of February, 1981. 
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